Six Design Theories for IS Security Policies and Guidelines by Siponen, Mikko
IS Security Policies and Guidelines/Siponen & Iivari 




 Research Article 
 
Six Design Theories for IS Security  
Policies and Guidelines 1 
 
Mikko Siponen 
Department of Information Processing Science 




Department of Information Processing Science 






The unpredictability of the business environment drives organizations to make rapid 
business decisions with little preparation. Exploiting sudden business opportunities may 
require a temporary violation of predefined information systems (IS) security policies. 
Existing research on IS security policies pays little attention to how such exceptional 
situations should be handled. We argue that normative theories from philosophy offer 
insights on how such situations can be resolved. Accordingly, this paper advances six 
design theories (the conservative-deontological, liberal-intuitive, prima-facie, virtue, 
utilitarian and universalizability theories) and outlines the use of their distinctive 
application principles in guiding the application of IS security policies. Based on the 
testable design product hypotheses of the six design theories, we derive a theoretical 
model to explain the influence of the different normative theories on the “success” of IS 




The functioning of modern society is increasingly reliant on computers and global 
networks. In such a society, information systems security, aimed at ensuring the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information, becomes a very important issue. 
Not only do security violations cause loss of valuable information and damage the 
organization’s reputation, but they also prevent organizations from trading. Hence, it is 
                                                 
1 Kalle Lyytinen was the accepting senior editor.  Sirkka Jarvenpaa and Yair Wand were the 
reviewers.  The earlier version of this paper was presented in the JAIS theory workshop at ICIS 
2004.  It was submitted on March 15, 2005, and went through 3 revisions.  
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important to ensure that organizations’ ISs are properly secured. While a number of 
technical solutions and secure system development methods exist for securing 
organizations’ systems (Backhouse and Dhillon, 2001; Siponen, 2005), both 
practitioners and scholars agree that an IS security policy, and its enforcement, is the 
necessary foundation of organizations’ IS security (e.g., Parker, 1997; Straub, 1990; 
Warman, 1992). In organizations whose future circumstances are difficult to predict in 
advance (Boyd and Fulk, 1996 p. 4; Daft, et al., 1988 p. 125), unexpected business 
opportunities may require actions that conflict with their IS security policy. In such 
situations, word-for-word compliance with a rigid IS policy may prevent organizations 
from taking advantage of such unanticipated business opportunities. We refer to these 
as exceptional situations.2 
 
While such exceptional situations are recognized in IS security literature (Baskerville, 
1995 p. 245; Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000 p. 126), extant research does not address 
how these exceptional situations should be handled.  
 
In trying to understand under what conditions normative IS security policies and 
guidelines may be violated, we find normative theories in philosophy extremely useful. 
Accordingly, this paper presents six design theories in the sense of Walls, Wildmeyer 
and El Sawy (1992) for the application of IS security guidelines in exceptional situations, 
influenced by normative theories in philosophy. Based on the testable design product 
hypotheses of the six design theories, we derive a theoretical model to explain the 
influence of the different normative theories on the “success” of IS security policies and 
guidelines.  
 
Research into IS security policies and guidelines in exceptional situations has value for 
scholars and practitioners. For scholars, the paper advances a foundation for future 
research on how to balance IS security and business opportunities in exceptional 
situations. For practitioners, the paper offers insights on how they may apply wisdom 
from applied philosophy in solving exceptional situations in practice.  
 
This paper is organized in six sections as follows. In the Section “Design Theories and 
Existing Work on Security Policies”,, an IS security policy design theory framework is 
first elaborated, including the three criteria for IS security polices and guidelines. Then, 
existing studies on IS security policies are scrutinized in order to point out the extent to 
which the extant studies on IS security policies meet these three criteria. At the end of 
the Section, it is pointed out that extant works on IS security policies do not address the 
third criterion (how to apply IS security guidelines and policies in exceptional situations). 
The Section “Philosophical Normative Theories and IS Security Policies and Guidelines” 
outlines normative theories for IS policies and guidelines, introducing six normative 
theories as kernel theories for IS security policies and guidelines, and Section “The Six 
Normative Theories and Design Theories for IS Security Policies and Guidelines” 
discusses these in more detail. Then an agenda for future research on the application of 
IS security policies and guidelines is proposed in the “Discussion” section. In the final 
section, the key findings of the paper are summarized. 
                                                 
2 Note that conceptually these ‘exceptional situations’ differ from ‘exceptions’ as “cases that 
cannot be correctly be processed by computer systems alone” (Strong and Miller, 1995, pp. 206). 
While the exceptional situations may be addressed following the organization’s IS security 
policies and guidelines, this may not be reasonable from the viewpoint of their business 
objectives. 
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Design Theories and Existing Work on Security Policies  
 
IS Design Theorizing and Security Policies   
 
Walls, Wildmeyer and El Sawy (1992) propose that design theories should be based on 
kernel theories and should inform the researcher by providing testable research 
hypotheses. They see IS design theories as having two dimensions: a product (e.g., a 
software product or security policy) and a design process (the phases to be followed in 
constructing the product) – see Figure 1. In addition, design theories are normative and 
prescriptive, as opposed to theories in natural science, which are descriptive, 
explanatory, and predictive (Markus, et al., 2002; Walls, et al., 1992 p. 37). 
 
Hevner, March, Park and Ram (2004 p. 77-78) recognize that designing policies is a 
potential application of design theory. In this paper, we view IS security policies and 
guidelines as design products. Typically, IS security policies and guidelines are 
normative lists of actions that the employees should (or should not) perform (Warman, 
1992 p. 309). However, the design of IS security policies and guidelines faces the 
problem that such policies and guidelines do not necessarily make it possible to address 
all situations reasonably. To illustrate this, Puhakainen (2006) describes a company in 
which IS security guidelines strictly forbid taking any information away from the company  
 
 
Figure 1. An IS security policy design theory (modified from Walls, et al., 1992) 
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premises without formal permission from the IS security manager. However, the 
employees of the company needed to take their laptops, USB sticks, and CDs to their 
homes and to meetings outside of the company. As a result, employees violated the IS 
security policy, since in some cases they felt they would lose their customers and 
collaborators if they waited for the formal approval process.  
 
The product is the IS security policy or guideline, also including an application principle 
stating how the IS security policies and guidelines are to be applied. The design method 
states how the product (IS security guideline) is to be crafted. Application principles may 
also guide the design of IS security policies and guidelines. 
 
As this case illustrates, it is important to know whether the policies and guidelines can be 
violated by employees in a situation where word-for-word compliance with them would 
jeopardize a business opportunity. And if they can, under what conditions and in what 
circumstances is this permissible? We claim that IS security policies and guidelines 
should be equipped with ‘application principles’ to solve such exceptional situations 
(Figure 1). Recognizing this, a design theory for IS security policies should meet three 
criteria – it should: (1) be based on kernel theories; (2) offer normative guidance for 
practitioners on how to design and apply such policies and guidelines;3 and (3) propose 
a research agenda (testable hypotheses) for scholars (Walls, et al., 1992).  
 
Extant Security Policies in the Light of IS Security Policy Design Theory 
 
This section examines the extent to which existing approaches to IS security policy 
address these three IS security design theory criteria (Table 1).  
 
Criterion 1: Kernel theories 
 
The underlying kernel theory provides the necessary foundation on which guidance for 
practitioners and a research agenda can be developed (Markus, et al., 2002). Of the 
extant studies, only Karyda, Kokolakis and Kiountouzis (2003) is explicitly derived from a 
reference discipline (first criterion). The lack of theoretical underpinnings may explain 
why studies on IS policies fail to offer concrete guidance to practitioners as to how to 
design IS security policies and how possible exceptional situations can be handled 
(criterion 2). 
 
Criterion 2: Application principles 
 
The application principles should provide advice on how to handle exceptional situations 
(second criterion), since adherence to a security policy in certain circumstances may 
prevent the achievement of business objectives (for example, a business opportunity 
suddenly emerges, but cannot be taken advantage of, as it would violate IS security 
policy and guidelines).  
 
Existing IS security policies do not provide advice on how to handle exceptional 
situations (criterion 4). Even though Corby (1999), Hale (1996), Palmer, Robinson, 
Patilla, and Moser (2001 p. 22), and Wood (1997c p. 16) recognize the need to make 
exceptions, of all the existing IS security policy studies, only Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) 
                                                 
3  Application principles are not covered by the original design theory framework of Walls, 
Wildmeyer and El Sawy (1992). 
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Table 1. Existing IS Security Policy Approaches and the Three IS Security Design 
Theory Criteria 4 








Baskerville and Siponen (2002) ? - ? 
Broderick (2001) - - - 
BS7799 - - - 
Corby (1999) - - ? 
Dhillon (1997) - - - 
Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) - ? - 
David (2002) - - - 
Friedl (1990) - - - 
Fulford and Doherty (2003) - - + 
Hale (1996) - - - 
Hickson (1997) - - - 
Höne and Eloff (2002) - - - 
ISF Standard (2003) - - - 
Karyda et al. (2002) + - ? 
Lindup (1995) - - - 
Nosworthy (2000) - - - 
Olnes (1994) - - - 
Osborne (1998) - - + 
Palmer et al. (2001) - - - 
Pounder (1997) - - - 
Pounder (2001) - - - 
Pounder (2002) - - - 
SSE-CMM (1998) - - - 
Walter (1993) - - - 
Warman (1992) - - ? 
Wood (1995) - - - 
Wood (1996a) - - - 
Wood (1996b) - - - 
Wood (1996c) - - - 
Wood (1997a) - - - 
Wood (1997b) - - - 
Wood (1997c) - - - 
Wylder (2003) - - ? 
 
can be regarded as providing guidance on how to handle exceptional situations (criterion 
2: application principles).  Dhillon and Backhouse (2000 p. 127-128) propose four 
principles: responsibility, integrity, trust, and ethicality. Although their work makes a 
novel contribution, it is not quite clear how their principles can be applied in practice 
(how does one know what an “ethical” action is, for example?), or how to proceed if 
these principles are in conflict with the business objectives of the company.  
                                                 
4 The symbol + means that the approach meets the criterion, and – refers to a lack of such a 
feature. The symbol ? means that, even though the approach does not explicitly address a certain 
criterion, there are implicit hints as to the existence of such a feature. 
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Criterion 3: Testable hypotheses 
 
‘Testable hypotheses’ refers to systematic research agendas that guide future research 
on IS security policies. While the approaches of Corby (1999), David (2002), Fulford and 
Doherty (2003), Karyda, Kokolakis and Kiountouzis. (2003), Osborne (1998), Baskerville 
and Siponen (2002), Warman (1992), and Wylder (2003) may be interpreted as having 
testable hypotheses or a research agenda (criterion 3), none of these studies present 
testable hypotheses with regard to application principles (criterion 2). 
 
Summarizing the analysis of 33 IS security policy studies, a few approaches address 
one or two of the IS security design theory criteria: kernel theories (criterion 1) and 
testable hypotheses (criterion 3), but none of them address guidelines to cover 
exceptional cases (criterion 2). Therefore, there is a need to seek alternative normative 
theories to guide application of IS security policies and guidelines.  
 





In seeking candidate kernel theories, we found the normative theories to constitute ideal 
reference theories for the application principles, for two reasons. First, IS design-
oriented theories are normative and prescriptive, in contrast to natural science theories, 
which are explanatory or predictive (Walls, et al., 1992). IS security policies are also 
seen as mandatory by nature (Wood, 1995): they lay down the IS security actions (the 
list of “dos and don’ts”) that employees should follow in general. Second, an IS security 
policy design theory should contain normative application principles on how to apply the 
list of ‘dos and don’ts’ (the security policies and guidelines) in exceptional situations. 
 
Recognizing this normative dimension, there is no doubt about what constitutes the ideal 
theoretical foundation (or kernel theory base) for the application principles: normative 
theories in philosophy. While empirical social sciences investigate what people do, 
normative theories ponder what people should do (Hare, 1997).5 Indeed, in the domain 
of normative theories, from Aristotle through Kant, and up to present-day thinkers, 
scholars have sought answers to such questions as how to a settle a conflict between 
two different norms, or how to act in cases where conforming to the established norm 
yields negative results. These problems are similar to those studied in this paper. Finally, 
the history of normative theories is more than 2,500 years old; thus, normative theories 
are mature in comparison to any other discipline. This being the case, normative 
theories are ideal candidates for kernel theories in the context of the present study. 
 
Alternative normative theories include the theory of information ethics (Floridi, 1999), 
Habermas’ (1990) discourse ethics, universal prescriptivism (Hare, 1952, 1963, 1981, 
1999), Kantian ethics (Kant, 1993), utilitarianism (e.g., Bentham, 1876; Mill, 1895), 
intuitionism (Ross, 1930), Mackie’s (1981) approach, the theory of justice (Rawls, 1972), 
emotivism (Stevenson, 1944), and virtue ethics (e.g., Hursthouse, 1996; MacIntyre, 
1987).  
                                                 
5 Hume (1711-1776) warns us, in his thesis of “no ought from an is”, about the logical problem of 
basing a normative action on empirical knowledge alone. 
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Six Normative Theories for IS Security Policies and Guidelines 
 
Of these alternative normative theories, we have selected six main categories of theories 
to form the basis for alternative application principles. These are the conservative 
deontological, the liberal-intuitive, the prima-facie, the virtue ethics, the utilitarian, and 
the universalizability theories. We do not claim that these six theories form the only way 
of categorizing normative theories. They do, however, cover a large body of extant 
normative theories, and they have obvious applicability for IS security policies and 
guidelines, as will be illustrated below (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Alternative Normative Theories on Which to Base Application Principles
Normative theories Recognize exceptional 
situations 
Method for handling 
the exceptional 
situations 
The conservative deontological No No method is provided 
The liberal-intuitive Yes, but does not take any normative stance No method is provided 
Prima-facie Yes Benefit  
The virtue ethics Yes Virtues 
The utilitarian Yes Overall happiness 
The universalizability theories Yes Universality thesis 
 
Deontological theories hold that objective moral rules exist. The conservative 
deontological theory stems from deontological moral norms, such as Kant’s doctrine of 
treating humans as an end rather than as a means (Kant, 1993). Another form of 
conservative deontological theory is present in Judeo-Christian teachings, where the 
Ten Commandments are interpreted literally. So, according to conservative 
deontological theory, rules in normative systems are absolute, predefined and intended 
to be followed literally. When applied to IS security policies and guidelines, rules in 
conservative deontological IS security policies and guidelines must be followed to the 
letter without thinking about possible consequences. 6  And, if some situation is not 
explicitly addressed in the conservative deontological IS security guideline, e.g., taking 
information off company premises (cf., example in section 2.1), then the action is not 
allowed by default.  
 
The opposite view to the conservative deontological theory is the liberal-intuitive theory, 
stemming from libertarianism. It holds that if something is not forbidden, it is allowed. In 
the case of IS security policies and guidelines, this means that if certain IS security 
situations are not covered by the IS security polices and guidelines, then employees are 
allowed to do whatever they want to in those situations7, 8. While the conservative 
deontological theory does not recognize exceptional situations at all (since if something 
is not addressed in the IS security policy, it is forbidden), the liberal-intuitive theory does 
not give any methodological advice on how to act in exceptional situations. To counter 
                                                 
6 Lupu and Sloman (1999 p. 854) call this policy the “negative authorization policy”. 
7 It stresses minimal external regulation and the maximization of the autonomy of the individual 
over authority: “Liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty” (Kukathas and Pettit, 1990 p. 
50). 
8 Lupu and Sloman (1999 p. 863) refer to a similar policy as the “open policy”; otherwise we find 
no examples on the liberal-intuitive theory in IS security literature. 
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this problem, a number of alternative theories (the prima-facie, the virtue ethics, the 
utilitarian, and the universalizability theories) have been advanced. 
 
The prima-facie theory from Ross (1930) recognizes exceptional situations. Applied to IS 
security, it takes the view that security guidelines should be followed in general. In 
exceptional situations, however, one may violate them if the business benefits of 
compromising the guidelines outweigh the benefits of complying with them. 
While the prima-facie theory focuses on calculating benefits, virtue ethics, forming the 
virtue design theory (Hursthouse, 1996; MacIntyre, 1987), suggest that we should 
instead develop virtues personally. Virtues are praiseworthy qualities or characteristics 
that people may possess.9 MacIntyre extracts unitary core concepts for the virtue design 
theory from different theories of virtue ethics: the virtues of justice, courage, and honesty 
(MacIntyre, 1987 p. 123 and 128). 10  Virtue ethics (MacIntyre, 1987) and Christian 
theology11 also adhere to the thesis of supererogation. In philosophy, supererogation 
refers to positive actions that go beyond what is required. Supererogatory actions are 
praiseworthy, yet at the same time voluntary. For example, an elderly or disabled person 
putting his or her life at very high risk in an attempt to save others from a fire may be 
considered a supererogatory action. The person acted virtuously, but had the person not 
taken the action, he could not be regarded as blameworthy. Applied to IS security 
policies and guidelines, the idea of supererogation means that the IS security policy and 
guidelines prescribe an ideal or a virtuous code of conduct for the organization’s 
employees to follow. Thus, actions in conflict with the IS security policies and guidelines 
are not deemed to be wrong or punishable.  
 
While the prima-facie theory stresses the business benefits and the virtue theory 
stresses cultivation of proper virtues in exceptional situations, the utilitarian theory 
(Bentham, 1876; Mill, 1895) suggests that the key issue is the maximization of utility. 
According to Bentham, the key idea in maximizing utility is the concept of felicity 
(happiness). For Bentham, felicity is a combination of pleasure and the absence of 
pain.12 Thus, in a nutshell, utilitarianism holds that an act that produces the greatest 
felicity for the greatest number of people, measured in terms of pleasure and absence of 
pain, is the right action.  
 
The universalizability theory, in turn, suggests that rather than relying on relativistic 
virtues and calculating benefits (prima-facie) or overall happiness (utilitarianism), an 
acceptable action should be one that the person would also accept if he were on the 
receiving end of the action. According to another interpretation, we should only accept 
those actions that we could accept no matter what position we held in society or the 
                                                 
9  MacIntyre divides the theories of virtue ethics into three categories: (1) virtues enable 
individuals to perform well in their social roles (e.g., a judge in court is a social role and it can be 
seen that judge is expected to be impartial and just; hence the virtues of a judge may include 
impartiality and justness); (2) virtues enable us to move towards the achievement of a certain 
ultimate natural or supernatural purpose (human telos) (as suggested by Aristotle, the New 
Testament, and Aquinas); (3) virtues contribute to the achievement of heavenly and earthly 
success (as suggested by Franklin) (MacIntyre, 1987 p. 122). 
10 MacIntyre does, however, leave the door open for other possible virtues.  
11 In theology, supererogation refers to good acts done in “a state of grace”. 
12 Other forms of utilitarianism include negative utilitarianism, which is aimed at maximizing the 
absence of pain. 
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organization. 13  Variations of the universality theses form the foundations of Kantian 
ethics, universal prescriptivism (Hare, 1981), the theory of justice (Rawls, 1971), and 
Judeo-Christian ethics.  
 
A Case to Illustrate the Six Normative Theories 
 
In this real case, a project team in a software house maintains close collaboration with 
customers when developing software. This software house has strict security rules laid 
down by a senior security specialist, who is regarded as the authority figure. The security 
policy includes a rule that states that passwords are personal and that one’s password 
cannot be given to anybody else. Any exception must be approved by the senior security 
specialist. During the summer, while the senior security specialist and most of the 
developers are on their holidays, a few members of the project team receive additional 
requirements and feature changes from an important customer. The members of the 
team need to make changes to the software quickly to keep to their deadline. To do this 
they need to access some files to which they currently do not have access (access can 
be granted by a developer and the security specialist or his subordinates). The senior 
security specialist cannot be reached at that time, and the developer who has control 
over the files is also on holiday. He is available, but cannot remember his password (he 
forgot it while on holiday). Subordinates of the senior security specialist can be 
contacted, but they do not dare to violate the IS security policy of the organization. As a 
result, the members of the project team are forced to wait for the senior security 
specialist to return in order to access the files. This will result in the software company 
missing the deadline. 
 
According to the conservative-deontological theory, the IS security policy cannot be 
violated, and therefore, in the above case, the subordinates of the senior security 
specialist should not violate the security policy of the organization under any 
circumstances. The subordinates must obey the security rules in all circumstances, and 
according to these rules the security specialist’s approval must be awaited. In this case, 
the liberal-intuitive theory desires the same response, since according to the security 
rules of the organization, every exception must be approved by the senior security 
specialist.  
 
According to the prima-facie theory, IS security policy can be violated provided that (i) 
business objectives and security requirements are in conflict, and (ii) the benefits of 
compromising those guidelines outweigh the benefits of complying with them. In this 
situation, the subordinates realize that the first condition is met. On the one hand, 
security rules dictate that the subordinates cannot grant access for the other members of 
the team. On the other, if access is not granted, negative ramifications for business may 
result, including losing an important client. Thus, in light of the prima-facie theory, given 
that the violation of the IS security policy would maximize business benefits, the IS 
security policy can be violated.  
 
                                                 
13 According to Rawls (1971), the universalizability thesis makes us ask what principles of justice 
we would choose to govern a society or an organization in which, as members of it, we could be 
anyone in any position (Rawls, 1971). Or, according to another interpretation of thesis: “…we 
accept only those moral prescriptions which we are prepared to prescribe for all similar cases, no 
matter what position we ourselves occupy in them.” (Hare, 1996 p. 177). 
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The virtue theory regards IS security policy compliance as voluntary, Thus, while 
adherence to the IS security policy is regarded as positive (as a ‘virtue’), the 
subordinates of the senior security specialist can exercise their own judgment if they 
wish. Moreover, according to virtue ethics, in exceptional situations the employees’ own 
judgment is acceptable if the actions are regarded as just, honest, and courageous. 
Which actions are just, honest, and courageous depends on the organizational culture in 
question. The subordinates may believe that in this scenario, for instance, just and 
honest imply that the action should be carried out in the firm’s and their customer’s best 
interests, without violating anyone’s rights. Recognizing that the subordinates can use 
their own judgment, and provided that violating the security rules in this case can be 
seen as just and honest as discussed above, the subordinates may violate the security 
rules and grant access to these project team members. 
 
If the software house had a utilitarian theory in place, they would need to follow the IS 
security guidelines in normal circumstances. In exceptional situations, or situations 
suspected to be exceptional, a resolution is arrived at by means of utilitarian happiness 
calculus. The subordinates of the security manager realize that this is not a normal 
situation. In order to implement the suddenly-emerged requirement from the important 
customer during the holiday season, the team members need to access certain files. To 
decide whether they can bypass the security rules, the subordinates should, according 
to the utilitarian theory, calculate the happiness of the greatest number of people, taking 
into account the absence of pain, and should favor the option that maximizes the overall 
happiness. Here “people” would refer to those persons affected by the decision on 
whether or not to violate the security rules. On the one hand, the security specialist’s 
subordinates may consider that a violation of the security policy will probably anger the 
security specialist. Thus, in utilitarian terms, non-compliance with the security rules 
causes unhappiness to the security manager. On the other hand, given the urgent 
business need to meet the requirements of the important customer, the violation of the 
IS security policy would in this case maximize the overall happiness in the company 
because complying with the IS security policy and guidelines results in the developers 
not being able to keep to the deadline. This is assumed to have two types of negative 
implications. First, they may lose the important customer, which may have direct 
monetary consequences. Second, it is assumed that maintaining tight security rules for 
their own sake in this case may cause dissatisfaction (unhappiness) among the team 
members, as they would feel that they were not able to do their work. Recognizing these 
factors, while disobedience to the security rules may increase the security manager’s 
unhappiness, the important customer’s and team members’ feelings of unhappiness that 
would result from non-compliance are much greater. Hence, if the subordinates are 
following utilitarian IS security policy theory, they should compromise the security rules 
in this situation. 
 
In the case of the universalizability theory, the IS security policy can be violated in 
exceptional situations, provided that the action in question satisfies one of the two 
universalizability rules. Let us assume that the company has adopted the second rule of 
the universalizability theory: if you were the president of the organization, would you 
allow action Y by any trustworthy X? Here, Y refers to violation of the IS security policy in 
order to speed up software development, and X refers to the members of the project 
group who need access to the files. In this case, the senior security specialist’s 
subordinates ponder whether they would allow the action if they were in the company 
president’s shoes. Recognizing the business need to violate the security policy, the 
security specialist’s subordinates see no reason why the president of the company 
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would not allow a violation of the security rule in this case. Adherence to the IS security 
policy would mean that the software would not be developed as agreed with the client, 
which would result in financial loss for this project (and perhaps also in the future, 
through loss of contracts), a bad reputation, and so on. Thus, in the light of the 
universalizability theory, the subordinates can violate the IS security policy. 
 
The Six Normative Theories and Design Theories for IS Security 
Policies and Guidelines 
 
Next we will describe the six normative theories as potential bases for design theories 
for IS security policies and guidelines. While it is impossible to list all exceptional 
situations in different companies,14 the application principles can be used to scrutinize 
whether IS security policies and guidelines can be violated in any given situation. The 
reader may then wonder why we need IS security policies or other norms. Instead, why 
not just use application principles in all situations? There is a practical reason for this. 
We may not have time to ponder all the situations we face every day by using the 
application principles. For all these “ordinary situations” we encounter, the established 
norms, like IS security policies and guidelines, are useful (cf., Hare, 1981; Twining and 
Myers, 1999 p. 15).  
 
Furthermore, normative theories in socio-politics and ethics typically ponder what is 
morally right for individuals. In this paper, we have made a point of departure by focusing 
on what is in the company’s interest. Our application of the normative theories is 
business-oriented: how can they be applied in the design of IS security policies and 
guidelines and application principles so that the IS security policies, guidelines, and 
application principles as a whole will serve the company in the best way? For this 
purpose, we will introduce the concept of Total Cost of Security Actions (TCSA). TCSA 
functions as the dependent variable to be minimized. TCSA is a measure of all costs 
resulting from developing IS security polices and guidelines, from violating them, and 
from complying with them. Thus, TCSA covers all costs that can be attributed to an IS 
security violation, including immediate recovery costs and potential losses, such as lost 
business opportunities or loss of reputation for the business. TCSA also includes the 
costs of potential loss of business opportunities resulting from adherence to the IS 
security policies and guidelines. For example, in the case presented in section 3.3, strict 
adherence to the IS security policies and guidelines results in the developers being 
unable to deliver the software to the client in time. This may damage their reputation in 
the eyes of the important client and lead to sanctions for not keeping the deadline. 
These, in turn, increase the risk that the important client will order its future software 
from competitors. Since such costs are different in different organizations and situations, 
it is impossible to provide a more explicit list of cost factors.  
 
Our analysis follows the structure of the design product side of Figure 1, distinguishing 
kernel theories, meta-requirements, application principles, and testable design product 
                                                 
14 An attempt to list all exceptional situations would lead to circular arguments, since if we tried to 
list all possible ordinary or exceptional situations, there would be “exceptional” situations in which 
this list would not apply. And then we would need additional application principles to solve these 
situations, and so on. Furthermore, when organizations face the same exceptional situations 
often enough the “exceptional situations” may become “ordinary,” and they may be subsequently 
captured by IS security policies and guidelines (cf., Hare, 1981). 
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hypotheses. Since we do not suggest any IS security policies and guidelines, we omit 
meta-design from our analysis. 
 
The Conservative Deontological Design Theory 
 
The kernel theories of a conservative deontological design theory for IS security policies 
and guidelines are deontological moral theories. The design theory claims that what is 
not allowed by the IS security policies and guidelines is strictly rejected regardless of the 
consequences to which it would lead (see Table 3, point 3: Application principles). Thus, 
the meta-requirement is that IS security policies should list actions that employees must 
perform (Table 3: Meta-requirements). Employees should simply follow the list of dos 
and don’ts in the IS security policies and guidelines “religiously.” The conservative 
deontological design theory is explicitly favored by David (2002 p. 510), for example. 
 
Table 3. The Conservative Deontological Design Theory for IS Security Policies 
and Guidelines 
1. Kernel theories Deontological moral theories.  
2. Meta-requirements IS security policies and guidelines must be comprehensive. 
IS security policies and guidelines must list all actions that 
employees must perform. 
3. Application principles Only the conventional level: follow the list of do’s and don’ts 
literally. 
4. Testable design 
product hypotheses 
H1. The more comprehensive the IS security policies and 
guidelines are, the lower the TCSA.  
H2. The less voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS 
security policies and guidelines, the lower the TCSA.  
 
The conservative deontological design theory implicitly assumes that the set of IS 
security policies should be as comprehensive as possible to define all allowable IS 
security actions. At the same time, it assumes that its application should be mandatory 
(non-voluntary). Yet no policy or guideline is absolutely mandatory, so employees could 
violate them if they decide to do so. In fact, each employee interprets a given IS security 
policy or guideline as mandatory to varying degrees (cf., Davidson, 1970). This links the 
hypotheses with the concept of “voluntariness” (Moore and Benbasat, 1991), and with 
the extant research on the impact of voluntariness on the acceptance of different IT 
artifacts (e.g., Iivari, 1996; Agarwal and Prasad, 1997; Karahanna, et al., 1999; 
Venkatesh, et al., 2003). Thus, the two testable design product hypotheses are: H1: the 
more comprehensive the IS security polices and guidelines are, the lower the total cost 
of Security Activities (TCSA); and H2: the more mandatory (i.e., less voluntary) the 
security policies and guidelines are, the more strictly enforced they will be, and the lower 
the TCSA will be. 
 
The Liberal-Intuitive Design Theory 
 
The kernel theory of a liberal-intuitive design theory for IS security policies and 
guidelines is libertarianism. According to liberal-intuitive design theory, those IS security 
actions that are not prohibited are allowed (Table 4). The first meta-requirement of this 
design theory differs from the conservative deontological design theory in that the liberal-
intuitive design theory lists not all, but only the necessary actions that employees must 
perform. Liberal-intuitive IS security policies and guidelines are intended to be followed 
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literally; however, the meta-requirement is that if something is not covered by the IS 
security policy and guidelines, employees can take appropriate action to remedy the 
situation. The application decision is based on an employee’s intuition.  
 
Table 4. The Liberal-Intuitive Design Theory for IS Security Policies and 
Guidelines 
1. Kernel theories Libertarianism, autonomy. 
2. Meta-requirements 1: IS security policies must list the necessary or key actions 
that employees must perform. 
2: If something is not covered by IS security policy and 
guidelines, employees can take appropriate action to remedy 
the situation. 
3. Application principles 1. IS security guidelines are intended to be followed literally. 
2. What is not explicitly denied is allowed. 
3. If something is not covered by IS security policy and 
guidelines, follow your intuition. 
4. Testable design 
product hypotheses 
H3: The smaller the set of necessary IS security policies and 
guidelines are, the lower the TCSA. 
H4: The more mandatory (less voluntary) it is for employees 
to follow the necessary IS security policies and guidelines, 
the lower the TCSA. 
 
The first meta-requirement that it is relevant to list only the very necessary IS security 
actions (Table 4) is very similar to the socio-technical design principle of minimal critical 
specification (Herbst, 1974). The principle of minimal critical specification in socio-
technical thinking means that one identifies only the minimal set of conditions required to 
create viable, self-maintaining, and self-adjusting production units. As a consequence, 
the liberal-intuitive design theory includes the hypothesis (H3) that the smaller the set of 
critical (necessary) IS security policies and guidelines is, the lower the TCSA will be. 
This is essentially based on the assumption that employees’ autonomy should be 
maximized, especially in situations not covered by the IS security policies and guidelines. 
However, the liberal-intuitive design theory presupposes strict compliance with the 
necessary IS security policies and guidelines. As a consequence, the second hypothesis 
claims that the more mandatory it is for employees to follow the critical IS security 
policies and guidelines, the lower the TCSA will be.  
 
In exceptional situations, the liberal-intuitive design trusts employees’ autonomy, 
suggesting that employees’ self-determination and intrinsic motivation lead to better 
acceptance of IS security guidelines and policies, compared to extrinsic motivation to 
comply with IS security guidelines. Thus, the advocates of the liberal-intuitive design 
theory recognize that stressing employees’ self-determination (employees’ freedom to 
make their own decisions) may have weaknesses in terms of TCSA. These weaknesses 
relate to the permissive nature of the design theory: the fact that employees can 
exercise their own judgment may lead to potential risks from security and business 
perspectives. Despite such risks, advocates of the liberal-intuitive design theory consider 
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The Prima-Facie Design Theory 
 
The kernel theory of the prima-facie design theory for IS security policies and guidelines 
is based on Ross’ (1930) prima-facie principles, taking the view that IS security policy 
and guidelines should be followed in normal situations. However, when solving conflicts 
in exceptional situations, the prima-facie design theory holds that IS security policies and 
guidelines can be formally violated, as long as the expected benefits of compromising 
those security guidelines (excluding a person’s egoistic/ideological benefits) clearly 
outweigh the expected benefits of complying with the security guidelines, in terms of the 
TCSA (Table 5).  
 
Table 5. The Prima-Facie Design Theory for IS Security Policies and Guidelines. 
1. Kernel theory The prima-facie principles of Ross. 
2. Meta-requirements IS security policies must list all actions that employees must 
perform in normal situations. 
3. Application principles The conventional level and critical levels. Guidelines can be 
violated in exceptional situations if the expected benefits of 
compromising the guidelines outweigh the expected benefits 
of complying with the security guidelines in terms of TCSA. 
4. Testable design 
product hypotheses 
H5. The more comprehensive the IS security policies and 
guidelines are, the lower the TCSA will be in normal 
situations. 
H6. The less voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS 
security policies and guidelines, the lower the TCSA in 
normal situations.  
H7. The more voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS 
security policies and guidelines and the more the expected 
benefits of compromising those guidelines outweigh the 
expected benefits of complying with the security guidelines, 
the lower the TCSA in exceptional situations. 
 
The prima-facie design theory includes Hypothesis H5, which states that the more 
comprehensive the IS security policies and guidelines are, the lower the TCSA will be in 
normal situations, and Hypothesis H6, which states that the more mandatory (less 
voluntary) compliance with IS security policies and guidelines is in normal situations, the 
lower TCSA will be. Hypothesis H7 assumes an interaction effect between voluntariness 
and expected benefits (expected benefits of compromising – expected benefits of 
complying): the more voluntary and the higher the net benefit, the lower TCSA will be. 
 
The Virtue Design Theory  
 
The kernel theories of the virtue design theory for IS security policies and guidelines are 
virtue ethics by MacIntyre (1987)—including the virtues of justice, courage, and 
honesty—and the thesis of supererogation. Thus, the meta-requirement of the virtue 
design theory states that IS security policies and guidelines are supererogatory, and 
describe the actions that virtuous employees follow.15  However, actions in conflict with 
IS security policies and guidelines are not considered to be wrong, or punishable. The 
                                                 
15 Here the IS security policy and guidelines are loosely interpreted as ‘the standard’, following 
MacIntyre’s (1987) term.  
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application decision in resolving possible conflicts between security policies and 
business goals is made in light of the virtues (justice, honesty, and courage) – see Table 
6. 
 
Table 6. The Virtue Design Theory for IS Security Policies and Guidelines. 
1. Kernel theories  Virtue ethics and the thesis of supererogation in virtue ethics.
2. Meta-requirements IS security policies and guidelines should list virtuous 
conduct. 
3. Application principles 1. Obedience to IS security guidelines is not obligatory, 
though it is virtuous. 
2. Virtuous actions, as defined by the IS security policy and 
guidelines, are welcomed, but not compulsory, in exceptional 
situations. 
4. Testable design 
product hypothesis 
H8. The more voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS 
security policies and guidelines, and the more virtuous (just, 
courageous and honest) the actions are, the lower the TCSA 
in exceptional situations.    
 
The testable design product hypothesis, H8, referring to the virtuousness of actions, 
differs from the prima-facie design theory, which refers to the relative benefits of 
compromising and complying with IS security policies and guidelines. 
 
The Utilitarian Design Theory 
 
Utilitarianism is the kernel theory of the utilitarian design theory for IS security policies 
and guidelines. The utilitarian design theory suggests that, in general, IS security 
policies and guidelines should be followed (Table 7).  
 
Table 7. The Utilitarian Design Theory for IS Security Policies and Guidelines. 
1. Kernel theory Utilitarianism. 
2. Meta-requirements IS security policies must list all the actions that employees 
must perform in normal circumstances. 
3. Application principles 1. Follow guidelines in normal circumstances. 
2. Otherwise, the happiness of the greatest number of people 
and the absence of pain are the factors that count in deciding 
whether an action is allowable. 
4. Testable design 
product hypotheses 
H5. The more comprehensive the IS security policies and 
guidelines are, the lower the TCSA will be in normal 
situations. 
H6. The less voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS 
security policies and guidelines, the lower the TCSA in 
normal situations.  
H9. The more voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS 
security policies and guidelines, and the more happiness 
brought about by the actions of employees, the lower the 
TCSA in exceptional situations. 
 
According to the utilitarian design theory, IS security policies and guidelines can be 
violated in special circumstances: they are to be compromised only if an act in violation 
of the security policy produces the greatest happiness, or good, for all the people 
affected by that action. Thus, the utilitarian design theory is similar to the prima-facie and 
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universalizability IS security policy design theories, in that they all recognize the need to 
allow for violation of IS security policies and guidelines, provided that this yields a more 
positive effect than would be produced by following the policies and guidelines. The 
utilitarian design theory views the happiness of the greatest number of people as the 
factor that counts in deciding whether an action is allowable (Table 7: Application 
principles). That is, the best action to minimize TCSA is that which maximizes overall 
happiness. 
 
The first two testable design product hypotheses, H5 and H6, are identical to those of 
the prima-facie theory. Hypothesis H9 refers, however, to overall happiness rather than 
to benefits, as in the case of the prima-facie theory. 
 
The Universalizability Design Theory 
 
The kernel theory of the universalizability design theory for IS security policies and 
guidelines is the thesis of universalizability. This view holds that the requirements of IS 
security policies and guidelines should, in general, be met. However, if considered 
inadequate (e.g., the rules are conflicting or, in an exceptional situation, the actions 
specified in the IS security guidelines do not seem to produce the best results in terms of 
TCSA), the IS security policies and guidelines can be violated, provided that the violation 
satisfies the thesis of universalizability.  
 
Table 8. Universalizability Design Theory for IS Security Policies and Guidelines 
1. Kernel theories Universalizability theories. 
2. Meta-requirements IS security policies must list all actions that employees must 
perform in normal circumstances. 
3. Application principles In normal circumstances, follow the standard IS security 
guideline. Otherwise, apply either of the two alternative 
universalizability principles: 
1: Action Y is allowed if it is allowed for any X in the same or 
a similar situation; 
2: If you were the security manager or the president of the 
organization, would you allow action Y by any trustworthy X?
4. Testable design 
product hypotheses 
H5. The more comprehensive the IS security policies and 
guidelines are, the lower the TCSA will be in normal 
situations. 
H6. The less voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS 
security policies and guidelines, the lower the TCSA in 
normal situations.  
H10. The more voluntary it is for employees to follow the IS 
security policies and guidelines, and the more universalizable 
the actions (of employees) are, the lower the TCSA in 
exceptional situations. 
 
The universalizability design theory has meta-requirements similar to the prima-facie and 
utilitarian design theories. However, the method used to solve possible conflicts or test 
the relevance of IS policies differs from those of the other design theories.  
 
The universalizability thesis consists of two sub-theses: “security partial” and “impartial,” 
which are the two application principles for solving possible conflicts or testing the 
relevance of an IS policy. The impartial universalizability thesis states: 
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Action Y is allowed if it is allowed for any X in the same or similar situation. 
The security/business objective partial universality thesis states: 
If you were the security manager or the president of the organization, would you 
allow action Y by any trustworthy X? 
 
X refers to any worker and Y to actions. Thus, in the case of the second (security partial 
universality) thesis, an employee considers whether, if he or she were the security 
manager or president, he or she would allow the action.  
 
The first testable design product Hypotheses H5 and H6 are identical to the prima-facie 
and utilitarian design theories. In terms of Hypothesis H10, the universalizability thesis in 
a sense requires absolute universalizability. However, in practice, the action may be 
more or less universally accepted by the members of society. Therefore, Hypothesis 
H10 recognizes different degrees of universalizability, but, it can also be interpreted as a 
dichotomous variable (non-universalizable, universalizable), if so desired. Otherwise, 
Hypothesis H10 is analogous to the corresponding hypothesis of the prima-facie, virtues, 
and utilitarian design theories, the difference being that it refers to universalizability 




The above analysis leads to the following classification of IS security policies and 
guidelines (Figure 2). The classification is based on the hypotheses generated in Tables 
3-8. Conservative-deontological theory, on the one hand, and liberal intuitive and prima-
facie design theories, on the other hand, represent opposite extremes.  
 
Figure 2. Classification of Design Theories for IS Security Policies and 
Guidelines 
 
The other three design theories represent intermediate positions between the two 
extremes. They share Hypotheses H5 and H6, but each of them proposes different 
reasons and rationales for the violation of IS security policies and guidelines in 
exceptional situations. 
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Discussion 
 
Implications for Practice  
 
This paper proposes six design theories based on normative theories developed in 
philosophy to make sense of alternative views of application principles. These 
application principles are important for practitioners not only in the development of IS 
security policies and guidelines, but also in the application of these policies in different 
situations. The alternative positions affect how comprehensive the IS security policies 
and guidelines should be, and the ways in which exceptional situations are addressed.  
The case of a Finnish scuba-diving site that helped Finnish victims and relatives after the 
North Sumatra tsunami in December 2004 (Nieminen, undated) illustrates the 
significance of the prima-facie, utilitarian, and universalizability design theories in an 
exceptional situation. Mr. Alex Nieminen, one of the administrators of the diving site, 
started to receive short messages from Finnish divers in Thailand soon after the 
catastrophe on December 26, 2004. As he received the messages pertaining to Finns 
who had been found alive in hotels and hospitals, Mr. Nieminen inserted their names on 
the website, www.sukellus.fi, providing information about survivors much earlier than the 
official Finnish authorities did.  
 
However, what Mr. Nieminen did was illegal. According to Finnish law, it is illegal to post 
lists of names without the consent of the person in question. In fact, Nieminen was 
contacted on December 30 by Mr. Reijo Aarnio, the national ombudsman of information 
security in Finland. However, the Finnish government and the national ombudsman 
decided to ignore the information security law in this exceptional situation. 
 
This example demonstrates the limitations of the conservative deontological design 
theory. First, practitioners need to be aware that compliance with IS security guidelines 
for their own sake may get in the way of unexpected business (or other) opportunities 
that require actions that conflict with the company’s IS security policy. Second, while it 
attempts to cover all security issues in a security policy, the conservative deontological 
design theory can easily lead to excessive security and unnecessary bureaucracy 
(Madsen, 1995). Thus, we see that the conservative-deontological design theory is 
impractical in organizations that have high environmental uncertainty (Boyd and Fulk, 
1996 p. 4; Daft, et al., 1988 p. 125), because of its inflexible nature. The more turbulent 
(having a fast rate of change), unpredictable and complex a business environment is, 
the more inadequate the conservative-deontological design theory is. Furthermore, the 
conservative-deontological design theory is postulated to be ineffective in organizations 
with instrumentally-oriented (employees are expected to do everything to further the 
company’s interest, regardless of the consequences), caring-oriented (employees are 
expected to what is best for everyone), or independence-oriented (employees are 
expected to follow their own beliefs) cultural norms, as observed in an empirical study by 
Victor and Cullen (1998). On the other hand, the conservative-deontological design 
theory is expected to be effective in rule-oriented organizations where people are used 
to acting strictly by the book (Loch and Conger, 1996; Victor and Cullen, 1998).  
 
The liberal-intuitive and virtue design theories are the two alternatives at the other 
extreme. Their potential strengths result from the freedom they bestow on employees. 
However, according to liberal intuitive thinking, this freedom would not have justified Mr. 
Nieminen’s violation of the law in the case above, since liberal-intuitive design theory 
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allows actions only in those situations that are not covered by policies or laws. In the 
case of virtue design theory, actions in conflict with the IS security policies and 
guidelines are not considered to be wrong, or punishable, as long as they can be 
considered virtuous (just, honest and courageous). The action of Mr. Nieminen can be 
considered courageous and therefore acceptable.    
  
The freedom allowed by treat two design theories may also be a security threat. The 
liberal-intuitive and virtue design theories rely on employees’ intuition either directly (in 
the liberal-intuitive design theory) or through virtues (in the case of virtue ethics). These 
may be poor guides in the case of IS security issues. 
 
The prima-facie, utilitarian, and universalizability design theories lie between the two 
extreme positions. The strength of these three design theories, compared to the 
conservative one, is their flexibility. They may lead to a better situation in terms of TCSA, 
particularly in exceptional situations. Another strength, compared with the liberal-intuitive 
and virtue design theories, relates to decision making and accountability in exceptional 
situations. The prima-facie, utilitarian, and universalizability design theories endeavor to 
offer more reliable application principles by placing certain restrictions on the employees’ 
thinking through, for instance, the universality principle or utilitarian calculations. They all 
emphasize that one should have good reasons to violate the IS security policies and 
guidelines. 
 
The possible weakness of the prima-facie, utilitarian, and universalizability design 
theories relates to the rules governing exceptions (application principles): that is, the 
factors that determine or justify the taking of an action that is in conflict with, or not 
covered by, the IS security policies and guidelines. In this respect, the prima-facie 
design theory stresses that the benefits of violating the guidelines must outweigh those 
of complying with the guidelines. However, this condition has its problems. For example, 
the sub-principle of the prima-facie design theory that states “the expected benefits of 
compromising the security guidelines (excluding a person’s egoistic benefits) clearly 
outweigh the expected benefits of complying with the guidelines” means that the 
judgments devolve to the employees, and thus allow for subjective interpretations. For 
instance, the view of what constitutes “benefits” may vary from person to person. 
Similarly, the utilitarian application principles suggest choosing the course of action that 
maximizes the happiness of the greatest number of people. But it is not easy to measure 
others’ happiness (Siponen and Vartiainen, 2001); and does such maximization of 
happiness necessarily lead to business success or security?  
 
The universalizability design theory tries to overcome these weaknesses by enforcing 
impartiality (the first principle) and the viewpoint of the security manager (the second 
principle). But can employees ultimately know how the security manager or the president 
of the organization would think? However, the strength of this design theory is that it 
constrains employees to making decisions as if they were in the shoes of the security 
manager or the president of the organization. In other words, even though no one can 
know another’s thoughts, the employees are required to do their best to maintain 
security from the security manager’s or the president’s point of view. 
 
Despite all the difficulties discussed above, the actions of Mr. Nieminen can be justified 
in terms of the prima-facie, utilitarian, and universalizability design theories. His action 
responded to an enormous demand for information when the Finnish authorities were 
unable to provide such information. On December 27 the website had 76,581 visitors, 
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the next day 204,516 visitors, the following day 255,943 visitors, and on December 
30,234,218 visitors, whereas the normal number of daily visitors was about 300. As a 
consequence, one can argue that the expected benefits of his illegal action far exceeded 
the expected benefits of complying with the law (prima-facie design theory). One can 
also argue that his illegal action of publishing the names of survivors brought about great 
happiness among people worried about their relatives and friends in the affected area in 
Thailand at the time of the tsunami (utilitarian design theory). It also seems that the 
national ombudsman of information security accepted Mr. Nieminen’s action in this 
situation, suggesting that partial universalizability applied in this case.16  
 
Research implications: A theoretical synthesis of the six design theories 
 
The above example demonstrates that it is not always justifiable to stick literally to IS 
security policies and guidelines. In an exceptional situation, one may have a good 
reason to violate IS security policies and guidelines. The prima-facie, utilitarian, and 
universalizability design theories provide general ideas on how to justify the violations. 
One research problem is to produce empirical evidence as to how common various 
categories of “exceptional” situations (where IS security policies and guidelines conflict 
with business objectives) are in practice. A second research problem is to find out how 
people address such conflicting situations: whether they just follow the rules, or violate 
them in some way. If they violate the rules, a third research question is how do they 
rationalize their actions, referring to net benefits, virtuousness, happiness, or perhaps 
the universalizability of their actions? A fourth research question concerns the 
consequences of complying with and violating IS security policies and guidelines: how 
effective the different rationales suggested by the six design theories are in guiding 
people’s actions. 
 
Figure 3 presents a research model for the fourth research question. Its core is based on 
the ten testable design product hypotheses derived from the six normative theories 
(Tables 3-8, Figure 2). Referring to our discussion in section 5.1, we have also included 
some external factors just to emphasize the fact that we do not claim that Hypotheses 
H1-H10 tell the whole story. The purpose of the inclusion of the two external variables is 
not to propose any contingency theory that there is a fit between the external factors and 
the six design theories. The only purpose is to illustrate that the external factors may 
influence the relationships assumed by Hypotheses H1-H10. The dotted arrows from 
“Environmental turbulence” and “Organizational culture” depict the influence discussed 
in Section 5.1 in the context of the conservative deontological design theory. They are 
expected to moderate the effects as illustrated by the dotted lines.17 The solid arrows 
from the two external variables remind one that these variables may also affect 
relationships in Figure 3 more generally.  
                                                 
16 In this ‘tsunami’ case, we replaced the CEO/security manager with the national ombudsman. 
17  Figure 3 makes a distinction between interaction effects (shown as joining lines) and 
moderators (shown as arrows heading towards other arrows). The variables in the interaction 
effect have a symmetrical role as predictors, and there may be more than two predictor variables 
in the interaction term, whereas the variables in the moderator case are not symmetrical, and the 
moderator moderates an association between one predictor variable and one dependent variable. 
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Figure 3. A Theoretical Synthesis of the Six Design Theories 
 
Figure 3 focuses on the factors that explain the “success” of IS security policies and 
guidelines at the organizational level, the success being interpreted in terms of the Total 
Cost of Security Actions (TCSA). The +/- signs after the hypotheses describe whether 
the hypothesized relationship is assumed to increase or decrease the dependent 
variable. The +/-signs next to the independent variables on the left describe whether the 
influence of the dependent variable is an interactive relationship. For example, in the 
case of H7, the more voluntary and the higher the expected benefits, the lower the 
TCSA in exceptional situations. 
 
As mentioned, the unit of analysis in Figure 3 is the organization. IS security policies and 
guidelines are, however, followed by individual employees. The individual 
adoption/acceptance of IS security policies and guidelines as a whole is another 
research topic, in which the different models of individual acceptance of IT artifacts, such 
as the Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) and its extension to cover 
moral behavior (Loch and Conger, 1996 p. 75-76), the Theory of Planned Behavior 
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(Ajzen, 1991), the Technology Acceptance Model (Davis, 1989), and the Theory of 
Intrinsic Motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985), can be utilized.18 Since these are widely 
applied in IS, we will not discuss them here. Our only comment here is that the 
differences between the normative theories may also have implications for overall 
acceptance. For example, while seeking to cover all situations comprehensively, the 
conservative-deontological design theory easily results in a massive document of 
policies and guidelines that becomes complex and difficult to use. The other design 
theories (liberal-intuitive, prima-facie, utilitarian, universalizability) can be formulated in a 
more condensed way and, therefore, may be easier to use. On the other hand, some 
people may expect clear and definite policies and guidelines as exemplified by the 
conservative-deontological design theory, and may find the alternative design theories 
difficult to interpret and use. 
 
Preliminary Ideas of Measuring the Constructs 
 
The empirical testing of the model proposed in Figure 3 requires operationalization of the 
concepts, which for some may be tricky, though not necessarily impossible. While it is 
beyond the scope of the present paper to discuss these measurement issues at length, 
we will outline preliminary ideas as to how the constructs identified in the model can be 
measured.  
 
Let us start with the easier constructs first. Organizational turbulence has been of 
considerable research interest in organizational contingency theory since the 1960s, 
leading to a number of measures (see Karimi et al., 2004, for a recent one). Although 
research into organizational culture has mostly been qualitative/idiographic, there have 
been some quantitative “measures” of it, too (e.g., Denison and Spreitzer, 1991; 
Hofstede, et al., 1990). In the case of voluntariness, we refer to Moore and Benbasat 
(1991) for a measurement instrument. 
 
In the case of the comprehensiveness of IS security policies and guidelines, one can 
conceive of two methods of measurement. One option is to discover respondents’ 
perceptions (preferably those of IS security experts) of this comprehensiveness using a 
number of items, for example, to what extent they agree with statements likes “The 
totality of IS security policies and guidelines in my organization is comprehensive” and 
“Nothing essential is missing from the totality of IS security policies and guidelines in my 
organization.” The second option is to list all the potential IS security issues to be 
covered (perhaps based on an IS security checklist or set of standards, such as 
BS7799-1, 2000; GAISP, 2003; ISF, 2003; Wood, et al., 1987), and to ask, in the case of 
each issue, whether the organization’s IS security policy and guidelines cover these 
issues.  
 
The necessity of IS security policies and guidelines can easily be measured using 
perceptual measures such as to what extent the respondent agrees with the statements, 
“IS security policy and guidelines are absolutely necessary in my organization” and “IS 
security policy and guidelines are absolutely critical in my organization.” 
 
                                                 
18 Note that focus in Figure 3 is on individual decisions whether to follow IS security policies and 
guidelines rather than on the adoption/acceptance of the IS security policy as a whole. In fact, 
Figure 3 presumes this adoption/acceptance, but it does not require that an employee follows IS 
security policies and guidelines in all situations.  
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Let us proceed now to the more tricky constructs in Figure 3. One problem is that it may 
be difficult for the respondents to associate the philosophical concepts with actual 
practice. Therefore, in moral psychology, it is not unusual to tie up the questions with 
concrete problems through an imagined case – the moral dilemmas used by Kohlberg in 
his Theory of Cognitive Moral Development (Kohlberg, 1981) being a well-known 
example. Accordingly, one or more cases, such as the one presented in section 3.3., 
can be used to associate respondents’ answers with concrete problems. As an 
illustration, we offer the following case (modified from the real case presented in section 
3.3).19  
 
Jack works in a software house, which has strict security rules laid down by a senior 
security specialist, who is regarded as the authority figure in security matters. The 
security policy includes a rule that states that passwords are personal and that one’s 
password cannot be given to anybody else. Any exception must be approved by the 
senior security specialist. During the summer, while the senior security specialist and 
most of the developers are on their holidays, Jack and a few of his co-workers receive 
additional requirements for feature changes from an important customer. Jack needs to 
make changes to the software quickly in order to keep to the deadline. To do this, Jack 
needs to access some files to which he currently does not have access (access can be 
granted by a developer, who is on his holiday at that time, and the security specialist or 
his subordinates). Jack cannot reach the senior security specialist at that time, and the 
developer who has control over the files is also on holiday. He is available, but cannot 
remember his password any more (he forgot it while on holiday). Jack contacts Matt, 
who is a subordinate of the senior security specialist, but Matt wonders if he dares to 
violate the IS security policy of the organization. If Matt does not grant access to Jack, 
the result is that the software company will miss the deadline, which further results in the 
software company having to compensate the client financially. This may further damage 
the reputation of the software company, which in turn may reduce future contracts, and 
lead to other consequences. 
    
After having read the example, the respondents can be asked to answer a number of 
questions, imagining that they are confronted with this problem in real life, in Matt’s 
position. The questions might include, for example, to what extent he or she agrees with 
statements such as “If I were absolutely sure that the benefits of violating the IS security 
policy and guidelines in the example situation would exceed the costs, I would be ready 
to violate the policy and guidelines” and “If I knew that the benefits of the violation would 
far exceed the costs, I would be ready to violate the policy and guidelines.”  
 
The example above may best illustrate expected benefits and costs (prima-facie design 
theory). One could imagine analogous examples that might identify the virtuousness, 
happiness, and universalizability of actions. In each case, one could present similar 
questions: “If I knew that violation of IS security policy and guidelines in the example 
situation represented just and honest action, I would be ready to violate the policy and 
guidelines,” “If I knew that violation of IS security policy and guidelines in the example 
situation would bring happiness to the people affected (such as employees, customers, 
and stakeholders of the organization), I would be ready to violate the policy and 
guidelines,” and “If I knew that the CEO of the organization would accept the violation of 
the security policy in the example situation, it would encourage me to violate the policy.”   
                                                 
19 Of course, it would be better if the imagined case could be rooted in each respondent’s own 
organization.  
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Summary 
 
Existing studies on IS security policies pay little attention to how to deal with exceptional 
situations in which IS security policies are in conflict with the business objectives of 
organizations. To fill this gap, this paper first develops an IS security design theory 
framework, and then proposes six kernel theories with distinctive application principles 
by which such conflicts can be resolved. These six kernel theories are: the conservative-
deontological, liberal-intuitive, prima-facie, virtue, utilitarian, and universalizability 
normative theories. Based on these, we derived six normative design theories for IS 
security policies and guidelines. The conservative-deontological design theory was 
argued to be suitable only in stable business environments and in rule-oriented 
organizations (where people are accustomed to acting by the book). Outside of rule-
oriented organizations, and in a turbulent business environment, it is advisable to adopt 
the prima-facie, the virtue, the utilitarian, or the universalizability design theory. These 
six design theories were synthesized into a theoretical model. Once tested empirically, 
the results will lead to new insights on the extent to which IS security policies and 
guidelines should be backed by expected net benefits, virtuous actions, happiness, and 
unversalizability. This will help organizations to design effective IS security policies and 
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